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The next US Administration will 
face many challenges: the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, Pakistan’s pos-
sible implosion, conflict with Iran, 
high energy and food prices, climate 
change and its effects, the economic 
growth of China and India and its 
implications, and the festering Israel-
Palestine quandary –not to mention 
a deepening credit crisis and wider 
economic recession, turmoil over 
immigration, growing health care 
costs, pending decisions on tax and 
energy policies, decaying infrastruc-
ture and the evident need to focus on 
education, criminal justice reform, 
competitiveness and other domestic 
challenges.
No one should expect the new U.S. 
Administration or the next Congress 
to give priority to relations with Latin 
America and the Caribbean. None of 
the countries of the Americas presents 
an imminent threat to U.S. national 
security, none is likely to be the source 
or target of significant international 
terrorism and none will be critical 
to resolving what most regard as the 
most pressing problems of U.S. foreign 
policy.
But although the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean pose no 
urgent issues for the United States, they 
will be increasingly important to the US 
future, not as areas of dramatic crisis 
but in a quotidian way. In fact, Latin 
America is one of the world regions 
with the greatest impact on the daily 
lives of US citizens.
This is true for four main reasons, 
different from the hoary axioms about 
Western Hemisphere security, extra-
hemispheric threats and Pan-American 
solidarity often cited in the past. 
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Latin America matters to the United 
States today, and will matter even more 
tomorrow, because of:
• Transnational issues that neither 
the United States nor any Latin Ameri-
can nation can successfully handle 
by itself, without close and sustained 
cooperation from regional partners. 
These include energy security, global 
warming, pollution and other envi-
ronmental issues, narcotics, crime and 
public health. 
• Demographic interdependence, 
arising from massive and sustained 
migration that has blurred the borders 
between the United States and its clos-
est neighbors and given rise to complex 
«intermestic» issues –those with both 
international and domestic facets– rang-
ing from education to health care, remit-
tances to drivers’ licenses, youth gangs to 
portable retirement pensions. 
• Its economic importance to the 
United States, both as a prime source 
of energy and other key resources vital 
for the US economy and as a priority 
market for the export of U.S. goods and 
services. The United States obtains over 
half of its energy imports from coun-
tries of the Western Hemisphere and 
exports $225 billion a year in goods 
to Latin America, four times more than 
current US exports to China. US firms 
have, but need to sustain, a competitive 
advantage in Latin American markets 
arising from proximity and familiarity 
plus cultural and demographic ties.
• And shared values, particularly 
fundamental human rights, including 
the rights of free political expression, 
effective democratic governance and 
consistent application of the rule of 
law. The American people intuit that 
these core values cannot prevail inter-
nationally if they do not succeed in the 
Western Hemisphere. At a time when 
the very difficult experiences in Iraq 
and elsewhere are discouraging many 
Americans about the prospects for 
expanding the influence of US ideals 
internationally, the shared commit-
ment throughout the Americas to the 
norms of democratic governance and 
the rule of law should be increasingly 
recognized as important.
Despite Latin America’s quotidian 
significance for the United States, US 
policies toward the region in recent 
years have been mostly ineffective. 
Instead of focusing on Latin America’s 
main concerns, Washington has tended 
to use the prism of international ter-
rorism to deal with Latin America, 
just as Washington used to make anti-
Communism the core of its approach in 
the Americas. Both the Administrations 
of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush em-
phasized Western Hemisphere summits 
even though these meetings typically 
produce little beyond photo opportu-
nities. Both Administrations continued 
to emphasize a proposed Free Trade 
Agreement for the Americas (FTAA) 
long after this goal receded from 
feasibility. Instead of building better 
bridges toward our closest neighbors, 
the United States started construction 
of a border fence at the frontier with 
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Mexico. Resentment of the United 
States, its global policies, and its inter-
mittent attentiveness to the Hemisphere 
have been building in much of Latin 
America, only a few years after Western 
Hemisphere cooperation had seemed to 
be strengthening.
For their part, various Latin Ameri-
can and Caribbean countries have been 
diversifying their international relation-
ships, building cooperation with the 
countries of the European Union, the 
APEC countries, China, India, Rus-
sia and Iran. In many countries of the 
Hemisphere, there is less inclination 
than formerly to look to Washington 
for leadership or even for close coopera-
tion. Western Hemisphere approaches 
to problem-solving have weakened.
The new U.S. Administration and 
Congress to take office in January 2009 
will have an important opportunity to 
try to reengage the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean in order 
to build mutually productive coopera-
tion. 
Here are my best suggestions for 
the consideration of the new U.S. au-
thorities. 
1) Rather than promise to pay 
more attention to Latin America, and 
then inevitably fall short, the next U.S. 
Administration and Congress should 
enhance the quality of the limited at-
tention that can realistically be devoted. 
Washington should update and improve 
mindsets and concepts and think more 
strategically. Instead of offering soar-
ing rhetoric about partnership from 
Alaska to Tierra del Fuego, the new 
Administration should work with Latin 
American and Caribbean nations on 
issues that can be addressed soon, such 
as energy, the environment, crime and 
education, thus building credibility 
that has been damaged after years of 
unfulfilled pledges. Instead of scram-
bling to counter Hugo Chavez and the 
«Bolivarian alternative» of anti-U.S. 
movements, Washington should con-
centrate on confronting the underlying 
issues that create space for populist 
demagogues.
2) The new authorities in Washing-
ton should more consistently disaggre-
gate Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Everyone knows, of course, that Latin 
American and Caribbean nations vary 
enormously; this is not new or pro-
found. During the past twenty years, 
however, there has been a tendency 
to emphasize convergence within the 
region: toward democratic gover-
nance, market-oriented economics, 
and policies of macroeconomic balance 
and regional integration. Although 
these convergent trends have been im-
portant, key differences persist among 
the countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean. 
Washington must recognize that 
some of these differences are growing, 
not shrinking, along five dimensions:
• Demographic and economic in-
terdependence with the United States 
–highest and still growing in Mexico, 
Central America and the Caribbean, 
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lowest and likely to remain low in the 
Southern Cone;
• The extent to which the coun-
tries have opened their economies to 
international competition: by far most 
fully in Chile, relatively much in Brazil, 
Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and 
some Central American nations; and 
less so in other countries; 
• The strength of democratic gover-
nance, including checks and balances, 
accountability and the rule of law: 
strong historically in Chile, Uruguay, 
Costa Rica; increasingly, if quite un-
evenly, robust in Brazil; gaining ground 
in Mexico but still being fashioned 
slowly through hard struggle there; 
arguably declining, or at least at risk, 
in Argentina; and under great strain in 
Venezuela, most of the Andean nations, 
much of Central America, Haiti and 
Paraguay;
• The relative effectiveness of civic 
and political institutions beyond the 
state: strongest in Chile, Uruguay, 
Costa Rica and perhaps Argentina; 
growing but still severely challenged 
in Brazil and Mexico, slowly regaining 
stature but still quite problematic in Co-
lombia; weak in Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Paraguay and most of Central America; 
deteriorating in Venezuela; and excep-
tionally weak in Haiti; and
• The special challenges of integrat-
ing more than thirty million marginal-
ized, disadvantaged and increasingly 
mobilized indigenous people –espe-
cially in Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
the Peruvian highlands and southern 
Mexico– and of incorporating Afro-
Latin Americans as full participants in 
those countries where they are still the 
object of racial discrimination.
Only when all these important struc-
tural differences and their political con-
sequences are consistently understood 
can the countries of Latin America and 
the Caribbean come into clear focus 
for US policy makers. Hemisphere-
wide summit conferences or broad 
regional initiatives are less likely to be 
effective than subregional efforts that 
bring together those countries with 
comparable or complementary issues 
and concerns.
3) Washington must escape the 
mindsets imposed by ideology and rhet-
oric in order to grasp the new realities 
of Latin America and the Caribbean.
For example, instead of dividing 
Latin America and the Caribbean di-
chotomously into «democracies» and 
«dictatorships», Washington needs 
to realize that the majority of Latin 
American and Caribbean nations have 
weak political institutions, low levels 
of accountability, and highly uneven 
application of the rule of law. Although 
the normative goal of democracy has 
been nearly universally embraced, a 
welcome advance in the past genera-
tion, effective democratic governance 
and the consistent application of the 
rule of law remain far from reality in 
many countries. A central question 
is whether the United States can help 
play an appropriate and effective role 
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in addressing this issue, at least in some 
countries.
  Instead of promoting free markets 
and the «Washington Consensus» as 
the always preferred approach, and cit-
ing Chile as the poster-child of this for-
mula, Washington should understand 
that most Latin Americans see things 
differently. They point out that Chile’s 
success in fact demonstrates the value 
of pragmatically combining market-
opening reforms with strengthened 
state capacity, sound public policies and 
vigorous state action. Some of Latin 
America’s governmental institutions 
need to become stronger, more com-
petent and more effective –not smaller 
or weaker– in order to deal with such 
issues as poverty, inequity, exclusion, 
crime, personal security and competi-
tiveness. This point needs to be inter-
nalized in Washington after a period of 
excessive faith in markets.
  The key distinctions in Latin Amer-
ica today are less whether an economy 
is market-driven or state-led but rather 
how well the government and other in-
stitutions incorporate feedback and ac-
countability into their decision-making 
processes, and whether competition 
among parties and sectors is construc-
tive and energizing or else polarizing 
and obstructive. Moving toward more 
democratic politics and economies that 
are more market-driven certainly can 
help meet these imperatives, but these 
trends are not enough without effective 
institutions, including political parties, 
and without sufficient state capacity.
4) Four changes in US policy that 
would have great positive impact in 
the Americas are strictly speaking not 
«Latin American policy» issues as such: 
immigration reform, a revised trade 
policy, a new emphasis on energy con-
servation and development, and a fresh 
approach to the narcotics issue.
• The next US Administration 
should propose a comprehensive and 
proactive immigration reform, one 
that is based on recognizing that labor 
markets and family dynamics will likely 
produce substantial immigration flows 
for the foreseeable future. A new immi-
gration policy should seek to manage 
and regulate these flows; enhance their 
benefits to the receiving communities; 
mitigate, compensate for and more 
fairly distribute their various costs; and 
also affirm core US values, including 
fundamental respect for law. 
Any viable plan will require coop-
eration with Mexico, Central America 
and the Caribbean on economic, labor, 
health, education, social, youth em-
ployment, law enforcement and infra-
structure issues, and thus needs to avoid 
name-calling and finger-pointing. The 
new US administration should consult 
with the Mexican, Central American 
and Caribbean governments to fashion 
joint approaches to these transnational 
issues.
Any feasible and sustainable US im-
migration policy will include improved 
border control and management; tem-
porary worker programs; meaningful 
employer sanctions for those hiring 
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unauthorized residents; and concerted 
efforts at various levels –including 
practical paths to earned citizenship 
or else long-term legal residence– to 
integrate those unauthorized residents 
who have been contributing to the 
United States and want to become part 
of the US community. It will take politi-
cal leadership and will in both the new 
Administration and the new Congress 
to achieve immigration reform, but the 
need is evident. Immigration reform 
would be important, not only for the 
United States but for many other coun-
tries of the Americas.
 • The negotiations in 2007 between 
the Bush Administration and Congres-
sional Democratic leadership, and 
then with the government of Peru, on 
the Free Trade Agreement with that 
country may show the way toward re-
constructing expanded and sustainable 
inter-American commercial coopera-
tion. It is not enough simply to stress 
the benefits of expanded trade for those 
who prosper while downplaying its 
costs and risks for others. The United 
States cannot expect open access for 
its exports while retaining pockets of 
strong protectionism for itself, precisely 
in sectors where developing countries, 
including Latin American economies, 
have competitive advantages. More 
needs to be done to compensate, pro-
tect, retrain and provide technical assis-
tance and access to credit to those who 
are displaced by expanded trade, both 
in the United States and in the econo-
mies of its trading partners, especially 
in the Americas. Under current condi-
tions, these provisions need to become 
part of new trade agreements, not just 
the subject of side accords or of vague 
promises to deal with the issue later. 
The next Administration and Congress 
should work together to win support 
both from business and labor to keep 
the United States globally competitive 
but also to open greater export oppor-
tunities to developing countries, includ-
ing those of Latin America, rather than 
to intensify targeted protectionism. 
Latin American countries, for their 
part, will need to improve protection of 
labor conditions and workers’ rights if 
trade agreements are to have a prospect 
for US approval.
• With the price of oil over $100 
a barrel, declining production of pe-
troleum in Mexico, Venezuela and 
Ecuador, rapidly rising demands for 
energy in China and India, geostrategic 
concerns about the Middle East and Af-
rica, and increased consensus about the 
harmful impact of carbon emissions, 
the next Administration and Congress 
must focus on energy security, including 
conservation as well as the innovative 
development of new energy supplies, 
particularly from renewable sources. 
The potential is great for important 
Western Hemisphere cooperation on 
energy, involving investment in pro-
ducing oil and natural gas in Mexico, 
Brazil, Venezuela, Bolivia and Cuba; 
expansion of nuclear power production 
in some countries; carefully targeted 
support for some biofuel development, 
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especially sugarcane-based ethanol, 
in Brazil, Cuba and elsewhere in the 
Caribbean; investments in wind, hydro 
and geothermal energy; and collabora-
tive research on both alternative fuels 
and conservation options.
• The new Administration and 
Congress, and Latin American govern-
ments, should all rethink the «war on 
drugs». The «war» metaphor should be 
dropped, because it reinforces the ten-
dencies to look for «victory» against a 
defined enemy and to favor mainly coer-
cive instruments. Both Washington and 
Latin American governments should 
stop emphasizing «narco-terrorists», 
even though there are undoubtedly 
nefarious links between traffickers and 
guerrillas, because the narcotics issue is 
not really primarily about terrorism or 
military security. It is rather a complex 
societal, cultural, medical and institu-
tional problem that has as much to do 
with deep-seated failures in advanced 
industrial countries as with weak gov-
ernance, crime, corruption and poverty 
in Latin American and other producing 
nations. The more honestly we all deal 
with the roots of this destructive busi-
ness, the more likely is international 
cooperation to reduce this traffic and 
to diminish its scope and harm.
The next Administration and Con-
gress should give much higher priority 
to prevention, treatment, rehabilitation 
and youth employment programs at 
home. It should provide more invest-
ment in well-structured alternative 
development and youth employment 
programs for regions where growing 
drug crops currently seems like the only 
alternative to dire poverty, and where 
local conditions and stakeholders pro-
vide some chance for success. It should 
concentrate less on fumigation of crops 
and interdiction of shipments and cor-
respondingly more on disrupting both 
the financial flows and the arms traffic 
from our country that lubricate and 
facilitate the drug trade. And it should 
redouble efforts to constructively en-
gage Latin American and Caribbean 
cooperation in countering all aspects of 
this corrosive enterprise, which increas-
ingly damages the whole region.
5) In its policies toward the Ameri-
cas, the new Administration should 
concentrate first on the U.S. relation-
ship with Mexico, Central America and 
the Caribbean. Together these countries 
account for about a third of the total 
population of Latin America and the 
Caribbean but for nearly half of all U.S. 
investment in the entire region, more 
than 70 percent of US-Latin American 
licit trade, and some 85 percent of all 
Latin American migration to the United 
States.
Continuing the trends of recent 
years, Mexico and the Caribbean and 
Central American nations are likely 
in the coming decade to become even 
more fully integrated within the United 
States. These countries will increasingly 
use the dollar as their informal and in 
some cases their official currencies. They 
will send most of their exports to the 
United States, and rely overwhelmingly 
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on remittances from their diasporas and 
on U.S. tourists, investment, imports 
and technology. They will continue to 
send many migrants northward, and 
many will accept increasing numbers 
of retired North Americans as long-
term residents as well as large numbers 
seeking inexpensive medical care and 
other services.  Transnational citizens 
and networks will grow in importance 
on such issues as portable international 
health insurance, extraterritorial ap-
plicability for Medicare benefits and 
bilingual education.  All these trends 
will almost certainly include Cuba, in 
time.
The intermestic issues that flow 
directly from the unique mutual inter-
penetration between the United States 
and its closest neighbors –immigration, 
narcotics and arms trafficking, youth 
gangs, citizen security, auto theft, 
money-laundering, responding to and 
mitigating the effects of hurricanes and 
other natural disasters, protecting  the 
environment and public health, law 
enforcement and border management– 
pose complex challenges for policy. 
The democratic political process, both 
in the United States and in the neigh-
boring countries, pushes policies on 
both sides in directions that are often 
diametrically opposed to what would 
be needed to secure the international 
cooperation required to manage thorny 
problems that transcend borders. Im-
migration policy is a vivid example; the 
points scored in the U.S. Congressional 
debates and approval by Congress of 
the border fence undoubtedly respond 
to domestic opinion but by the same 
token make it harder to work with 
Mexico and the countries of Central 
America on immigration and on other 
issues. This dynamic has also been 
true of anti-narcotics policy, and of 
agricultural subsidies that are imposed 
by domestic lobbies and are difficult to 
undo, even when they impose dispro-
portionate costs on neighbors.
This dilemma –that the policy 
approaches most attractive at home 
often block needed international coop-
eration– is certainly not limited to the 
United States. The impulses to place 
responsibility for tough problems on 
the other side of the border, and to as-
sert «sovereignty» even when strictly 
national control is no longer possible 
in practical terms, are reciprocal and 
interactive. They present a major chal-
lenge, for which existing concepts and 
institutions are inadequate. The new 
Administration and Congress should 
establish official and nongovernmen-
tal consultations with counterparts 
in Canada, Mexico, Central America 
and the Caribbean on the full range of 
substantive and institutional challenges 
posed by increased interdependence in 
this whole close-knit region. The aim 
should be nothing less than to forge 
a shared vision of the whole region’s 
future and of how to achieve it.
6)  The second emphasis should be 
Brazil, where the long-trumpeted future 
has arrived, or at least is much closer. 
In the last twenty years, Brazil has 
opened important parts of its economy 
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to international competition, modern-
ized much of its agricultural sector, 
and developed a number of industries 
with continental and even world-wide 
presence.  Brazil has slowly but surely 
strengthened its state, private sector 
and non-governmental institutions. 
It has secured financial stability and 
investment grade status, attracted very 
substantial foreign investment, and pro-
duced steady if still modest economic 
growth. The recent oil finds reinforce 
the likelihood that Brazil’s growth will 
accelerate. Together with Chile, Brazil 
has also begun to reduce absolute pov-
erty and gross inequity, two of the most 
intractable problems faced by Latin 
America and Caribbean nations. And 
Brazil is making notable though still far 
from sufficient progress in combating 
corruption, crime, violence, impunity 
and lack of accountability. 
These transformations make it desir-
able and possible for the United States 
to work closely with Brazil as a strategic 
partner. The two countries have many 
shared interests: enhancing energy 
security, promoting regional stability, 
protecting the environment and pub-
lic health, liberalizing and expanding 
international trade in agriculture and 
services, and strengthening global gov-
ernance. Washington and Brazil should 
also work together to better manage 
conflicting international economic 
and commercial interests by striving 
to overcome short-term domestic inter-
est group pressures in their respective 
countries in order to facilitate long-term 
trade, investment and prosperity. This 
will not be easy, but an Administration 
with strategic vision might make some 
headway if the government of Brazil is 
ready to do its part.
7) The Andean Ridge nations are 
quite diverse but all, to differing but 
invariably high degrees, are plagued 
by weak political institutions. Most 
face the unresolved integration of large 
indigenous populations, and all must 
address the incorporation of millions 
of persons, not only indigenous, who 
live in extreme poverty.  Such poverty, 
gross inequities, social exclusion, ris-
ing ethnic and subnational regional 
consciousness, violence, the weak pres-
ence of the state in rural areas and the 
further undermining of already feeble 
institutions are a volatile combination. 
In these circumstances, the mantra that 
free markets and democratic politics 
inevitably strengthen and support each 
other in a powerful virtuous circle sim-
ply does not work.
The narcotics trade is at least as 
much symptom as cause of these con-
ditions; addressing the drug trade in 
isolation will therefore have little effect. 
By the same token, combating guerrilla 
and paramilitary movements through 
military means alone is unlikely, by 
itself, to have any enduring impact. 
Only if and when the underlying and 
interrelated problems are addressed 
in integral fashion can the Andean 
Ridge nations hope to achieve sus-
tained political stability and economic 
development. Strengthening the state’s 
capacity to provide order depends fun-
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damentally on bolstering its capacity to 
deliver economic growth, basic services, 
improved equity, and the consistent ap-
plication of the rule of law. Nothing the 
United States can do will substitute for 
local leadership that deals effectively 
with all these fundamental problems. 
Where such leadership emerges, the 
United States should support their ef-
forts, without being so intrusive as to 
become part of the problem.
Each of the Andean countries is 
distinct, their situations are fluid and 
uncertain, and in some cases they 
are in conflict with each other. Peru’s 
democratic government has to over-
come deep alienation in the country’s 
highland and jungle regions by deliver-
ing concrete results, not mere rhetoric 
or gestures. In Bolivia and Ecuador, 
efforts to «refound» national identity, 
build new and more inclusionary po-
litical institutions and capture more 
of the benefits from natural resources 
face the constraints of the international 
economy as well as deep suspicion from 
established national and regional elites 
and from many middle class profes-
sionals. Colombia has made progress 
in overcoming insurgent movements, 
restoring urban peace and expanding 
the influence of institutions but still 
faces embedded violence and pervasive 
corruption. And Venezuela is deeply po-
larized, with Chavez’ slowed but by no 
means assuredly halted march toward 
more consolidated authoritarian and 
personal rule on the basis of popular 
support from sectors previously with-
out voice or influence.
Advancing US interests and the 
prospects for inter-American coop-
eration in these complex circumstances 
requires patient, nuanced, sensitive and 
case by case treatment, not broad-brush 
policies. Career diplomats have been 
increasingly skillful in the latter years 
of the Bush Administration, for the 
most part, in managing US relations 
with the diverse Andean countries by 
avoiding confrontation and trying to 
find ways to be constructive. The new 
Administration would be well-advised 
to continue this approach and to seek 
low-key cooperation from like-minded 
governments in the region.
8) Cuba, however, cries out for 
fresh US responses to changing circum-
stances. The long-standing US policy 
of denial, embargo and exclusion was 
developed in the Cold War context, 
and was not demonstrably successful 
even then. The new Administration and 
Congress should promptly redefine the 
objectives of US policy in the light of 
a fundamentally altered international 
reality, the ongoing leadership transi-
tion in Cuba, the evolution and gen-
erational transformation of the Cuban 
American community, and of broader 
US interests, beyond the politics of the 
electoral college.
The primary aim of US policy at 
this stage should be to increase the 
likelihood that Cuba and the United 
States can and will cooperate on their 
shared concerns-migration, energy, 
narcotics, the environment, public 
health, and mitigating hurricanes and 
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other natural disasters. At the same 
time, Washington should do all it can 
to expand family, academic, and other 
non-governmental contacts, in order 
to help rebuild badly frayed communi-
cations and trust. As an earnest of its 
intent and a symbolic step potentially 
important in other world situations, 
the new Administration should offer to 
resume normal diplomatic relations, 
without preconditions. Pragmatic 
negotiations should be initiated to 
find a realistic solution to the claims 
arising from Cuban expropriations 
nearly fifty years ago. On the basis 
of improved communication and 
expanding practical cooperation, the 
United States, in concert with other 
countries, can best support those in 
Cuba who want to construct demo-
cratic institutions and governance, 
and the Cuban-American community 
can more likely come to play an im-
portant role in the island’s economic 
recovery and development.
9) Perhaps most important, the 
next US Administration and Congress 
should understand and explain to the 
American public why the United States 
would gain more stable neighbors, ex-
panded markets, more attractive invest-
ment opportunities and more congenial 
tourist destinations if the countries 
of Latin America and the Caribbean 
could reduce grinding poverty, gross 
inequities and ethnic exclusion. These 
conditions fuel polarization, lend them-
selves to demagogic exploitation, and 
undermine both democratic governance 
and sustainable policies of economic 
growth and development.
U.S. public policy instruments and 
available resources today are too limit-
ed to make an immediate and dramatic 
impact on Latin America’s poverty, 
inequity and exclusion; this is not the 
time to recommend another «Alliance 
for Progress». But the United States 
can certainly do much more on this 
agenda than the pale imitations of the 
Venezuela-Cuban programs announced 
on President Bush’s 2007 trip to Latin 
America. Washington can work to en-
hance the social impact of remittances; 
support micro-finance programs; and 
build on the experience of the Millen-
nium Challenge initiative to establish a 
region-wide social development fund to 
target poverty reduction efforts and en-
gage especially vulnerable populations, 
not only in the poorest countries but in 
the regions of every country where dire 
poverty exists. It should provide multi-
lateral credit to help energy-importing 
countries adjust during a period of very 
high costs; support innovative edu-
cational reforms; combat small arms 
trafficking; and deal with youth gangs 
as a transnational problem that requires 
improving education and employing 
more young people.
Many of these programs already are 
in place on a modest scale, but the next 
Administration and Congress should 
give them additional support; this 
would not be very expensive and could 
make a big difference. And Washington 
should mobilize both public and private 
sector efforts, in tandem, to strengthen 
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infrastructure in Latin America and to 
expand energy production and distri-
bution—major ways of accelerating 
the region’s growth that are very much 
in the interest of the United States. On 
all these issues, multilateral approaches, 
and particularly redoubled support for 
the Inter-American Development Bank, 
are advisable.
10) Finally, and also vitally im-
portant, the new Administration and 
Congress should work together to build 
mutual respect in the Americas as part 
of a broader reconsideration of the US 
role in the world. President George W. 
Bush traveled to Latin America and 
the Caribbean more than any other US 
president, and some specific US policies 
in the Western Hemisphere during his 
administration, especially in the second 
term, have been on the whole positive, 
if insufficient. But the stature and ap-
peal of the United States in the region 
have plummeted in recent years because 
of US policies elsewhere in the world 
and because the style of US interaction 
with Latin Americans has so often been 
dismissive or intrusive: from customs 
and immigration procedures at the 
individual level to irksome pressures 
on Latin American governments on 
various votes in international organi-
zations. 
The next Administration should 
build upon the unprecedented efforts 
made by Brazil, Chile and Argentina 
to help Haiti reverse its decline, and 
enlist these and other countries to 
take the lead in building new relations 
with Cuba. It should warmly welcome 
Canada’s increasing role in the Ameri-
cas, and should encourage Canada 
to step forward on some issues and 
relationships where a high US profile 
is likely counterproductive. The new 
Administration should recommit the 
United States to active support of the 
Organization of American States and 
the United Nations. Washington should 
endorse and adhere to the International 
Criminal Court, and drop pressures on 
Latin American nations to grant U.S. 
personnel exemptions from the Court’s 
jurisdiction. It should engage actively and 
urgently in global cooperation in response 
to climate change, and should urge Latin 
American governments, too, to do their 
part. Washington should also recognize 
and celebrate the bicentennial of South 
American independence in 2010, perhaps 
by proposing and providing funding and 
technology for new Western Hemisphere 
educational initiatives.
More generally, the substance and 
tone of inter-American relations would 
be most quickly and substantially im-
proved if the United States returns to 
a world role that is respectful of inter-
national law and opinion, cooperative 
rather than domineering, committed 
to multilateralism and international 
institutions, sensitive to Latin American 
aspirations for broader international 
recognition, and true to the fundamen-
tal values that are shared by citizens 
throughout the Americas. The new 
Administration should make it clear 
early on that it plans to steer U.S. for-
eign policy on this course.
